CENUSA: “In this spirit, the efforts of European integration are confronted with the power of the Russian-Eurasian “alternative”.
Balancing Moldova’s foreign policy seems to become the essential element of President Igor Dodon’s mandate, which expires in the fall of 2020. As a leader of pro-Russian forces, and in the absence of any serious resistance in domestic politics, the President is determined to influence the parameters of the foreign policy towards a “strategic partnership” with Russia, write the expert Dionis Cenusa in his analysis for IPN. Except for early elections, so far uncertain, nothing else is able to temper its desire, which is materializing, to raise Russia’s profile in the configuration of national priorities.
In this spirit, the efforts of European integration are confronted with the power of the Russian-Eurasian “alternative”. Thus, inevitably, the attitude towards veritable, tiring, but modernizing changes in any field, from economic production to the perception of values, will weaken because a simpler model is suggested.
The intention of the French President Emmanuel Macron to “reinvent an architecture of security and trust” between Russia and EU indicates on the emergence of a window of opportunity for re-launching relations with Moscow (Elysee.fr, August 19, 2019). That includes dealing with security issues in the common European neighborhood. Paris’s initiative has led to the restart of the Russian-French Security Council on security issues, just one month after the Macron-Putin meeting. The focus of the Council is going to be the development of certain ideas regarding “strategic stability and European security” (MID.ru, September, 8 2019).
The optimism of the French side, calmly accepted by Germany and other European states, including the EU, stems from an almost absolute certainty that Ukraine under the presidency of Volodymyr Zelensky is willing to make all necessary concessions to stop the war in Donbas. As a result of his sincere commitment to end the war at any cost, though accompanied by multiple hidden risks, President Zelensky accepted the arrangements for an exchange of prisoners with Russia, agreed directly by Russian President Vladimir Putin. As a result, 35 Ukrainians were released (Reuters September 7, 2019), of which 24 Ukrainian sailors and 11 political prisoners, illegally detained by the Russian authorities. At the same time, 35 Russian and Ukrainian citizens, detained in Ukraine for military activity in Donbas, were transported to Russia, including Ukrainian Volodymyr Tsemakh, requested by the Dutch authorities (UNIAN, September 8, 2019) for involvement in the downing of the MH17 civil aircraft in 2014 (Radio Free Europe, September 5, 2019). The exchange of prisoners prompted the discussion on the prospect of a final settlement of the “Donbas file”, with positive effects for all parties involved, but mostly for Russia. At the same time, the revival of the dialogue between Kiev and Moscow facilitates the pro-Russian rhetoric within the Moldovan governing coalition and helps to multiply the perception that Russia would play a constructive role in the region, including in the settlement of the Transnistrian conflict.
The merging of geopolitical interests in Ukraine is of far greater importance than the perspective of the settlement of the Transnistrian conflict, which has been in a “frozen” state for over two decades. However, the last steps of President Dodon externally, on the East-West directions, highlight his attempt to package the “balanced” foreign policy together with the Transnistrian issue. During his visit to Brussels, the second after the first one in February 2017, Igor Dodon articulated the points of the old “comprehensive package for Moldova”. Invoked at the Munich Security Conference in February 2019, the “comprehensive package” is based on two concepts. The first refers to “promoting a balanced foreign policy”, and the second refers to “strengthening the principle of neutrality”, internationally recognized (Presedinte.md, February15, 2019).
The consensus of external actors – US, EU and Russia – concerning the overcoming of the Moldovan political crisis of June 2019 served as a benchmark to justify the validity of the concepts infused in the above mentioned “comprehensive package”. These concepts were introduced in the discussions with the Head of EU diplomacy Federica Mogherini (Presedinte.md, September 5, 2019) and with NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg. From a proposal ignored at the Munich Conference, the “balanced foreign policy based on the status of neutrality” has been transformed by Igor Dodon into a “a basic priority for the leadership of the Republic of Moldova” (Presedinte.md, September 5, 2019). Not shared by Prime Minister Maia Sandu and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and not consulted with the Moldovan civil society, these foreign policy aspirations are illegitimate to start with. However, President Dodon plans to discuss the “comprehensive package for Moldova” with the EU, US and Russia and with them “to develop a road map for its successful implementation” (TASS, August 27, 2019).
Neither theoretically nor practically, such a “package” is somehow logical or achievable, even if President Dodon prioritizes it on his political agenda. First of all, foreign policy and neutrality status are an emanation of popular sovereignty and cannot be fixed from the outside, if the country is a recognized subject of international law. Another logic flaw of the proposed mechanism is that any intervention by the US, EU or Russia in matters of domestic policy will be equivalent to an interference in Moldova’s internal affairs.
Russia prefers to “normalize” relations with countries in the region, which are facing separatism, with the ultimate aim of deepening Russian influence. The mechanical embrace of the model suggested by the Russian side can lead to the inevitable “transnistrization” of Ukraine. The “normalization” of relations, as in the case of Georgia, may also result in border revision (“borderization”) by the separatist regions supported by Russia (South Ossetia). Therefore, when normalizing Russian-Ukrainian relations, the West has the obligation to support the national interests of Ukraine, thus investing in the stability of a country with European aspirations and in the Eastern security of the European continent.
Any kind of “package” for Moldova, used to immobilize the foreign policy or intervene in the status of neutrality, already prescribed in the supreme law, is illegitimate a priori. No matter how resonant President Dodon’s position would be abroad, his gestures seem to serve Russia’s interests rather than promote the national ones, including by expressly ignoring the commitments to the Association Agreement with the EU. The Title II, Article 3 of the Agreement, stipulates that the EU-Moldova political dialogue “will enhance the effectiveness of political cooperation and promote convergence in foreign and security policy”. How much is this provision compatible with the “comprehensive package” claimed by President Dodon?
